Case Summaries

Criminal Law & Procedure

[02/03] US v. Mahin
In a prosecution on two counts of possessing a firearm or ammunition while subject to a domestic violence protective order in violation of 18 USC section 922(g)(8), the judgment of conviction is: 1) affirmed in part, where the statute and its application to the defendant's firearm use the same day he was served with a protective order did not violate the Second Amendment under the intermediate scrutiny standard; and 2) reversed in part and remanded for resentencing, where it was plain error to convict and sentence the defendant on two separate counts for the simultaneous possession of a firearm and ammunition under section 922(g)(8).

[02/03] US v. Culbertson
In a prosecution in which the defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, the case is remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction, where: 1) there was an inadequate factual basis for the defendant's guilty plea with respect to the quantity of drugs for which he was responsible; and 2) the district court's error in accepting the defendant's plea was not harmless.

[02/03] US v. Leahy
In a sentencing challenge brought by a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, the district court's 10-year sentence is affirmed, where: 1) the district court's application of enhancements under the sentencing guidelines and its inclusion of criminal history points was procedurally reasonable; and 2) the sentence, although the maximum possible, was substantively reasonable, as the district court articulated a plausible sentencing rationale and imposed a sentence within the range of reasonable outcomes.

[02/02] US v. Rivera-Santana
In a sentencing challenge after the appellant was convicted of illegal reentry into the United States after being removed for a conviction of an aggravated felony, the sentencing court's judgment order is affirmed, where: 1) two upward departures in the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, augmented by an upward variance of 90 months therefrom, were not procedurally unreasonable; and 2) the resulting sentence, which was the statutory maximum, was not substantively unreasonable.

[02/02] People v. Brents
In a prosecution for first-degree murder and other crimes which resulted in a conviction and death sentence, the judgment is reversed as to the sentence of death, and the jury's true finding on the kidnapping special circumstance allegation is stricken, where the jury was not properly instructed regarding the need to find an independent felonious purpose to kidnap the victim, but the convictions are otherwise upheld where: 1) hearsay statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 791(b) as prior consistent statements; 2) there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of a photograph of the victim's body; 3) the trial court did not violate Penal Code section 654's prohibition against multiple sentences for a single act or course of conduct by imposing a death sentence for the murder conviction and a consecutive 25-years-to-life term for the felony assault conviction; and 4) the trial court did not make multiple errors, so that the defendant's claim of cumulative prejudice necessarily failed.

[02/02] People v. Elliott
On appeal of the death sentence after conviction for crimes including first-degree murder with the special circumstance of murder during the commission of a robbery, the sentence is affirmed against numerous and various challenges on issues relating to: 1) pretrial procedures and jury selection; 2) the defendant's guilt; 3) the penalty imposed; and 4) the adequacy of the appellate record.

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Family Law

[02/02] Southerland v. City of New York
In a suit under 42 USC Section 1983 asserting that a New York City children's services caseworker entered the plaintiffs' home unlawfully and effected an unconstitutional removal of children into state custody, the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant caseworker is: 1) affirmed with respect to the dismissal of the father's substantive due process claim; but 2) vacated with respect to the father's and his children's Fourth Amendment unlawful-search and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims and the children's unlawful-seizure claim, where the district court wrongfully concluded that the caseworker was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to all of the claims against him.

[02/02] Marriage of Walker
In a family court proceeding in which the recipient of a California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS) disability allowance challenged earlier family court orders awarding a community property interest in the allowance to his former spouse, the family court's denial of the appellant's motion to set aside the earlier orders is reversed, where the family court erred as a matter of law in concluding that the recipient had made "no mistake" in agreeing that his spouse had a community property interest in his disability allowance and thus should not have denied his motion on this basis.

[02/02] Marriage of Wahl
On appeal from an order requiring an ex-wife to pay to her former husband $552,153.28 in attorney's fees and costs as a sanction because of her conduct with respect to two post-dissolution orders, the order is affirmed, where the record disclosed no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award, and additional sanctions are imposed against the appellant and her appellate attorneys on a finding that the appeal is frivolous.

[01/31] T.W. v. Superior Court (San Diego County Health and Human Servs. Agency)
In proceedings in mandate to review an order designating the specific placement of a dependent child after termination of parental rights, the petition is granted with directions, where the district court abused its discretion by denying a petition by the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency to remove the child from the home of his prospective adoptive parent, because the district court did not give appropriate weight to the legislature's goal of securing an adoptive home for a dependent child that is free from the influences of criminal activity and substance abuse.

[01/26] Tracy J. v. Superior Court
On a petition by developmentally disabled parents for review of juvenile court orders terminating family reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, the petition is granted and a writ of mandate is issued, where the parents did not receive reasonable family reunification services from the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency, which unreasonably limited visitation services.

[01/19] E.C. v. J.V.
On a petition to establish a parental relationship with a minor, the trial court's order finding, that the appellant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was a presumed parent under the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), is reversed and remanded, where: 1) the trial court misapplied the UPA to the facts of the case by considering facts irrelevant to determining the appellant's commitment to the minor; and 2) it was necessary to remand the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion with a clear understanding of the law and determine whether the appellant held out the minor to be her natural child.

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